Which means the issuer has to be involved in every attestation and you aren't allowed to own/control your private key.
The government shouldn't know if/how many times I use my ID—you would be essentially building a country-wide blackmail database since it's a near direct proxy for porn usage. And it doesn't even matter if it's true, people will assume it anyway.
Your system effectively collects exactly the data ZKP is intended to protect.
Which is a long way of saying "ZKP" isn't an answer to this problem because you can't actually have zero knowledge in a system where people have little incentive to keep their key a secret.
My example is still just as good if the ID holder is complicit.
But also, this on-device fingerprint MFA would presumably be fairly bypassable. E.g. just glitch the device to extract the private key. ... and of course all the power hungry / extra complex ZKP machinery means less resources spent on preventing glitch attacks.
Also if you enforce the use of Yubikey or a similar DRM protected device then we're back to the user not actually being able to own/control their key. And if you don't it's a second password which can be shared out.
"Just use existing OTP" is a model that assumes that people actually want to protect their credentials. This is a Netflix password sharing situation and OTP didn't solve it.
The government shouldn't know if/how many times I use my ID—you would be essentially building a country-wide blackmail database since it's a near direct proxy for porn usage. And it doesn't even matter if it's true, people will assume it anyway.
Your system effectively collects exactly the data ZKP is intended to protect.
Which is a long way of saying "ZKP" isn't an answer to this problem because you can't actually have zero knowledge in a system where people have little incentive to keep their key a secret.